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NO TES
represented in J.R. and Institutionalized Juveniles, these recent
decisions reveal an unwillingness to depart from more firmly
established rights of family autonomy and a belief that, in cases of
immature and/or incompetent children, their most fundamental right
is protection from their own poor judgment. 8 Traditionally, the
family has functioned as the guardian of its individual members, par-
ticularly those incapable of protecting their own interests. Relative
to these children, the traditional family role continues to receive
maximum constitutional protection and the support of a majority of
the Court.
Theresa Gallion
Ambach v. Norwick: A FURTHER RETREAT FROM Graham
Two permanent-resident alien1 school teachers' instituted an ac-
tion to contest the constitutionality of a New York statute' pro-
68. For expansion on this proposition, see Hafen, supra note 64, at 651-52.
1. "The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United
States." Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1976). An
alien who has been granted the privilege of residing permanently in the United States
as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws is said to have been "lawful-
ly admitted for permanent residence." See id. §§ 101(a)(15), 101(a)(20) & 245, 8 U.S.C. §§
1101(a)(15), 1101(a)(20) & 1255 (1976). For an outline of the regulations pertaining to ad-
justing one's status from that of a nonimmigrant to that of a person admitted for per-
manent residence, see E. RUBIN, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE A87-A92 (1978).
This note is limited primarily to a discussion of discrimination against resident
aliens.
2. The original plaintiff, S. Norwick, was born in Scotland and is a British sub-
ject. T. Dachinger, who obtained leave to intervene as a plaintiff, was born in Finland
and remains a citizen of that country. The plaintiffs' applications for teaching cer-
tificates were denied because of their failure to meet the citizenship requirements of
section 3001(3) of the New York Education Law. Ambach v. Norwick, 99 S. Ct. 1589,
1591-92 (1979). For the text of section 3001(3), see note 3, infra.
3. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3001(3) (McKinney 1967). Section 3001(3) provides in perti-
nent part:
No person shall be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools of the
state who is: ... (3) Not a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not ap-
ply, however, to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed, provided such
teacher shall make due application to become a citizen and thereafter within the
time prescribed by law shall become a citizen.
This statute provides that temporary permits can be issued for persons who are in-
eligible for citizenship because of oversubscribed quotas. The Commissioner of Educa-
tion can and has provided for temporary certificates for aliens who are not yet eligible
for citizenship. 99 S. Ct. at 1591 n.2.
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hibiting the permanent certification as a public school teacher of any
alien who has not manifested an intention to apply for United States
citizenship. A three-judge district court panel, employing "close
judicial scrutiny,"4 granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,
finding that the statute discriminated against aliens in violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' The
United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the statute
was constitutional because the citizenship-based classification bore a
rational relationship to the legitimate state interest of promoting
civic values in the public school system. Ambach v. Norwick, 99 S.
Ct. 1589 (1979).
The Supreme Court as long ago as 1886 in Yick Wo v. Hopkins'
ruled that an alien is a "person" entitled to the benefit of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' Although the Court
4. Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913, 917-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
In reviewing equal protection challenges to statutes, the Supreme Court has
developed and generally has utilized a two-tiered analytical approach based on the
nature of the right being regulated and/or the type of classification which the regula-
tion creates. See Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Foreward: Constitutional Ad-
judication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 95 (1966);
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments]; Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term,
Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
Legislative classifications impairing the exercise of a fundamental right or
discriminating against suspect categories are subject to close judicial scrutiny. See,
e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-55 (1966). Rights which are explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution are fundamental rights. San Antonio Ind.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). Classifications affecting discrete and
insular minorities, against whom prejudice acts to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, may call for a
"searching judicial inquiry." See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938). To survive an equal protection challenge under close judicial scrutiny,
such a statutory classifiction must be necessary to promote a compelling state interest
and must be narrowly drawn so that it furthers only the compelling state interest ad-
vanced in support of it. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Under this two-
tiered analytical approach, classifications which do not evoke close judicial scrutiny
must only pass a rational relationship test to survive an equal protection challenge.
Under this test the statute is presumed to be constitutional unless the classification
itself is irrational or the classification does not rationally promote a legitimate govern-
mental function. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
This two-tiered approach was developed by the Warren Court during the 1960's.
The Burger Court's discontent with the sharp dichotomy of the two-tiered approach
has led to the formulation of a third basis for analysis. Using this approach, the Court
has struck down legislative classifications without finding a fundamental right or
suspect category. See generally Gunther, supra, at 10-24.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part: "No state shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
6. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
7. In Yick Wo the Court invalidated a San Francisco municipal ordinance
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in Yick Wo held that aliens are protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment, during the next few decades it routinely upheld classifications
based on alienage. The Court gave recognition to a state's police
power to regulate harmful and dangerous occupations' and a state's
proprietary interest in the public domain9 in developing what came
to be known as the "public interest doctrine.""0 In applying this doc-
regulating the operation of laundries on the ground that the ordinance was
discriminatorily enforced against Chinese operators. The ordinance prohibited the
operation of a laundry in a wooden structure within the limits of the city and county of
San Francisco unless the Board of Supervisors gave its permission. In 1880 (the time
of passage of the ordinance) there were 320 laundries in the city and county of which
310 were constructed of wood and 240 were owned and operated by Chinese. All
Chinese applications for permission to operate were denied and all those of Caucasians
were granted. Id. at 358-59 & 361. The Court held:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protec-
tion of citizens .... These provisions are universal in their application, to all per-
sons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race,
of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws.
Id. at 369.
8. See, e.g., Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927). The Clarke Court,
upholding a Cincinnati ordinance prohibiting aliens from owning and operating pool
halls, noted that the "harmful and vicious tendencies of public billiard and pool rooms"
caused it to be a business of dangerous tendencies from which aliens could be excluded
due to the "associations, experiences and interests of members of the class." Id. at 397.
9. See, e.g., Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (upholding a Washington
statute denying aliens the right to own farm land); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915)
(upholding a New York statute requiring citizenship before one could be awarded
public works contracts); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (upholding a
Pennsylvania statute prohibiting aliens from killing wild game).
10. The Court expressly rejected what it called the "special public-interest doc-
trine" in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See text at notes 21-23, infra.
Judge (later Justice) Cardozo's words in the case of People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427, 214
N.Y. 154, affd, 239 U.S. 195 (1915), upholding a New York statute prohibiting the
employment of aliens on public works are illustrative of the breadth of the doctrine:
The members of the state are its citizens. Those who are not citizens are not
members of the state .... Every citizen has a like interest in the application of
the public wealth to the common good, and the like right to demand that there be
nothing of partiality, nothing of merely selfish favoritism, in the administration of
the trust. But an alien has no such interest; and hence results a difference in the
measure of his right. To disqualify citizens from employment of the public works
is not only discrimination, but arbitrary discrimination. To disqualify aliens is
discrimination, indeed, but not arbitrary discrimination; for the principle of exclu-
sion is the restriction of the resources of the state to the advancement and profit
of the members of the state. Ungenerous and unwise such discrimination may be.
It is not for that reason unlawful.
The equal protection of the laws is due to aliens as to citizens; but equal protec-
tion does not mean that those who have no interest in the common property of
the state must share in that property on the same terms as those who have an in-
terest.
Id. at 429, 214 N.Y. at 160-62 (citations omitted).
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trine, the Court excluded aliens from a variety of enterprises."1
Yet, there were areas which the Court found to be outside the
scope of the public interest doctrine. In 1915 the Court struck down
an Arizona law which required that at least eighty percent of the
employees in businesses with more than five workers be citizens,'2
holding that a state's interest in the public domain cannot support
the exclusion of aliens from the "common occupations of the com-
munity.""3 Although the Court declared the law unconstitutional
because of its violation of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment,' the Court also noted that a state's decision to
deny an alien the right to work in the common occupations of the
community would be inconsistent with the federal government's
decision that he should be allowed to enter and reside within the
United States. On this basis, the Court implied that such a state
policy was impermissible."
No real inroads into the public interest doctrine were made until
a 1948 decision, Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission,'" in which
the Court, on both equal protection and federal preemption grounds,
invalidated a California statute forbidding the issuance of a com-
11. See Note, A Dual Standard for State Discrimination Against Aliens, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1516 (1979).
12. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
13. Id. at 41. The Court wrote:
It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common
occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and
opportunity that it is the purpose of the [fourteenth] Amendment to secure. If this
could be refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of
the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws would be a barren
form of words.
Id. (citation omitted).
The Court noted, however, that the statute in question did not "pertain to the
regulation or distribution of the public domain, or of the common property or
resources of the people of the State, the enjoyment of which may be limited to its
citizens as against both aliens and the citizens of other States." Id. at 39-40.
14. Id. at 43.
15. According to the Court:
The authority to control immigration-to admit or exclude aliens-is vested sole-
ly in the Federal Government. The assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the
opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the State would be
tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode, for in
ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work. And, if such a policy
were permissible, the practical result would be that those lawfully admitted to
the country under the authority of the acts of Congress, instead of enjoying in a
substantial sense and in their full scope the privileges conferred by the admission,
would be segregated in such of the States as chose to offer hospitality.
Id. at 42 (citations omitted).
16. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
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merical fishing license to any person ineligible for citizenship. 7 The
Court stated that "the power of a state to apply its laws exclusively
to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits."' 8
California argued that, since the federal government regulated im-
migration and naturalization in part on the basis of race and color
classifications, the state should be allowed to use these classifica-
tions to prevent resident aliens from earning a living in the same
manner as the state's citizens.' 9 In rejecting the state's argument,
the Court asserted that a state cannot interfere with the conditions
imposed by the federal government regarding the entrance,
naturalization, or residence of aliens."
Finally, in 1971 the Court in Graham v. Richardson2' abandoned
the special public interest doctrine altogether in invalidating
Arizona and Pennsylvania statutes denying welfare benefits to resi-
dent aliens. The Court held that legislative classifications based on
alienage are "inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny."22 Furthermore, the decision was based on the fact that the
17. In Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), the Court had struck down a
California statute which forbade aliens ineligible for United States citizenship from ac-
quiring, owning, occupying, leasing, or transferring agricultural land. The Court had
done so, however, because the law discriminated against the alien owner's son who
was a United States citizen.
18. 334 U.S. at 420.
19. Id. at 418-19.
20. The Court wrote:
The Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining what
aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regula-
tion of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their
naturalization. Under the Constitution the states are granted no such powers;
they can neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Con-
gress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States
or the several states. State laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the
entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with this
constitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigration . ...
Id. at 419 (citation omitted).
21. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
22. Id. at 372. In analyzing the classification, the Court added: "Aliens as a class
are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom heightened judicial
solicitude is appropriate." Id. See note 4, supra.
Justice Rehnquist, however, has maintained that legislative classifications based on
alienage should not be a suspect category:
The Fourteenth Amendment . . . contains no language concerning "inherently
suspect classifications," or, for that matter, merely "suspect classifications." The
principal purpose of those who drafted and adopted the Amendment was to pro-
hibit the States from invidiously discriminating by reason of race, and, because, of
this plainly manifested intent, classifications based on race have rightly been held
"suspect" under the Amendment. But there is no language used in the Amend-
ment, or any historical evidence as to the intent of the Framers, which would sug-
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states' actions in this area were inconsistent with the federal
government's power to regulate aliens' entrance and residence and
were, therefore, constitutionally impermissible3
But two years later the Court seemingly provided for an excep-
tion to this strict scrutiny treatment in dicta in the case of Sugar-
man v. Dougall2  Using strict scrutiny as dictated by Graham, the
Court in Sugarman invalidated a New York law25 providing that only
United States citizens could hold permanent positions in the com-
petitive class of the state civil service. However, the Court
distinguished the situation presented from that in which the
challenged classification is applied to voter qualifications or to state
elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial
gest to the slightest degree that it was intended to render alienage a "suspect"
classification, [or] that it was designed in any way to protect "discrete and insular
minorities" other than racial minorities ....
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649-50 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1052-53 (1978).
23. 403 U.S. at 376-80. However, in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), the
Supreme Court upheld a federal statute conditioning an alien's eligibility for federal
medical insurance program benefits on continuous residency in the United States for a,
five-year period and on admission for permanent residence. The Court reasoned that
Congress in the exercise of its control over naturalization and immigration could make
laws which would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. Concerning this federal power,
the Court stated:
Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers,
and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing
political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character
more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary.
Id. at 81.
24. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
25. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 53(1) (1958). In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a Civil Service Commission regulation ex-
cluding resident aliens from the competitive service of the Federal Civil Service
System was unconstitutional as a violation of the procedural requirements of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment because neither the President nor the Congress
mandated the regulation. But the Court stated that the "paramount federal power
over immigration and naturalization foreclosed a simple extension of the holding in
Sugarman as decisive of this case." Id. at 100.
The Court implied that such a regulation authorized by the President or Congress
would be constitutional, and listed with apparent approval a number of reasons to sup-
port the regulation at the federal level. Id. at 103-05. Apparently, the Court would rely
'on the President's treaty-making power and the federal government's power over im-
migration and naturalization to uphold such a federal regulation:
We may assume with the petitioners that if the Congress or the President has ex-
pressly imposed the citizenship requirement, it would be justified by the national
interest in providing an incentive for aliens to become naturalized, or possibly
even as providing the President with an expendable token for treaty negotiating.
Id. at 105.
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positions; then, a rational relationship standard"6 would properly be
used to scrutinize the classification." The Court reasoned that a
state has a "historical power to exclude aliens from participation in
its democratic political institutions" 8 and "officers who participate
directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public
policy perform functions that go to the heart of representative
government."'
In re Griffiths, ° handed down the same day as Sugarman, in-
dicated the restricted scope to be given this "governmental
function" exception.' Refusing to equate the practice of law with
the essential governmental functions outlined in Sugarman, the
Court struck down a Connecticut statute which prohibited aliens
from practicing law in the state. The Court found that, although a
lawyer was an important professional leader with access to the
courts, he was not close enough to the core of the political process
to be characterized as a formulator of governmental policy.2
26. See note 4, supra.
27. 413 U.S. at 647.
28. Id. at 648.
29. Id. at 647. The Court explained:
[O]ur scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters resting firm-
ly within a State's constitutional prerogatives. This is no more than a recognition
of a state's historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic
institutions, and a recognition of a State's constitutional responsibility for the
establishment and operation of its own government, as well as the qualifications
of an appropriately designated class of public office holders.
Id. at 648 (citations omitted).
30. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
31. In Foley v. Connalie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
majority, described the police function as "one of the basic functions of government."
Id. at 297. In Ambach v. Norwick, 99 S. Ct. 1589 (1979), Justice Powell's majority opin-
ion spoke of "[t]he rule for governmental functions" as an exception to the general
strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 1593. This exception will be referred to as the "govern-
mental function" exception throughout the remainder of this note.
In recent years, the Court in Examining Board of Engineers, Architects &
Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), and in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S.
1 (1977), has indicated that the establishment of the governmental function exception
was not a prelude to a wave of new exceptions nor an abandonment of Graham. In Ex-
amining Board, the Court, using strict scrutiny, declared unconstitutional a Puerto
Rico statute which permitted only United States citizens to practice as civil engineers.
In Nyquist, the Court, again employing strict scrutiny, invalidated a New York law
barring certain aliens from state financial assistance to higher education. In describing
the governmental function exception, the Nyquist Court wrote:
[A]s Sugarman makes quite clear, the Court had in mind a State's historical and
constitutional powers to define the qualifications of voters, or of "elective or im-
portant nonelective" officials "who participate directly in the formulation, execu-
tion, or review of broad public policy." In re Griffiths, decided the same day,
reflects the narrowness of the exception.
Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
32. 413 U.S. at 729.
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In 1978 in Foley v. Connalie,3 the Court applied the governmen-
tal function exception thus placing a New York statute, which re-
quired all police officers to be citizens of the United States, within
the confines of the rational relationship test instead of subjecting it
to close judicial scrutiny. The Court emphasized that the police func-
tion fulfilled a fundamental obligation of a government to its consti-
tuency"4  and that the plenary discretionary powers 5 of the
policeman made him a member of the category of "'important
nonelective ... officers who participate directly in the ... execution
... of broad public policy."'3 Thus, the citizenship requirement bore
a rational relationship to the special demands of being a police of-
ficer. Since the state could reasonably presume that a citizen is
more "familiar with and sympathetic to American traditions,"37 it
could lawfully restrict "the performance of this important respon-
sibility to citizens of the United States.''38
In the instant case, Ambach v. Norwick," a divided Court"
refused to subject to close judicial scrutiny4 a New York statute42
refusing aliens the right to employment as public school teachers."
In determining whether, for equal protection analysis, teaching in
public schools was within the governmental function exception, the
Court examined two factors: (1) the role of public education in a
democratic society and (2) the degree of responsibility and discretion
teachers possess in fulfilling that role.44
Addressing the first factor, the Court stated that "[plublic
education, like the police function, 'fulfills a most fundamental
33. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
34. Id. at 297.
35. The Court stated that police officers are "clothed with authority to exercise
an almost infinite variety of discretionary powers" the execution of which "affects
members of the public significantly and often in the most sensitive areas of daily life."
Id.
36. Id. at 300, quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647 (emphasis in original).
37. 435 U.S. at 299-300.
38. Id. at 300. 0
39. 99 S. Ct. 1589 (1979).
40. Justice Powell wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart, White, and Rehnquist joined. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting
opinion, in which. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined. The voting pattern
duplicated the vote in Foley except that Justice Blackmun concurred in that result and
voted to uphold the statute in question.
41. See note 4, supra.
42. See note 3, supra.
43. See note 2, supra. Both women had married United States citizens, had lived
in the United States since the mid-sixties, and, although eligible for United States
citizenship, had chosen not to apply for such citizenship.
44. 99 S. Ct. at 1594.
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obligation of government to its constituency.'"' Noted by the Court
as having a history of judicial recognition were the public school's
functions of preparing individuals for participation as citizens and
preserving the values upon which our society rests."6
The Court then found that the teachers within the public school
system have a critical role in developing a student's attitude toward
government and understanding of the role of citizens in our society.
This finding was based on the Court's observations that: (1) teachers
have direct, day-to-day contact with the student in both classroom
and other activities of the school; (2) teachers have wide discretion
over the way the course material is communicated to students; and
(3) teachers serve as role models for their students. 7 Additionally,
even those teachers whose specialty is not in courses most closely
related to government play a role in civic understanding.
Having found that teachers were within the governmental func-
tion exception, the Court had only to examine the contested statute
using a rational relationship test. The Court observed that the
statute was carefully drawn since it only excluded aliens who had
demonstrated their unwillingness to apply for United States citizen-
ship.49 Sustaining the statute, the Court acknowledged that "[t]he
45. Id., quoting Foley v. Connalie, 435 U.S. at 297.
46. 99 S. Ct. at 1594. The Court cited an extensive list of cases. Id. at 1595.
Quoting from Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), the Court wrote:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is the principle instrument in awaking the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment.
99 S. Ct. at 1594-95. The Court perceived the public school as "inculcating fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system." Id. at 1595.
Several ways in which the New York Education Law reflected the school's role as a
promoter of patriotism and citizenship were specifically referred to, such as the re-
quirement of saluting the flag and other patriotic exercises; the requirement that
courses such as civics, United States and New York history, and principles of
American government be taught; and the requirement that the schools provide instruc-
tion "'to promote a spirit of patroitic and civic service and obligation and to foster in
the children of the state moral and intellectual qualities which are essential in prepar-
ing to meet the obligations of citizenship in peace or in war."' Id. at 1595 n.8, quoting
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 801(1) (McKinney 1970).
47. 99 S. Ct. at 1595-96. The Court recognized that "through both the presentation
of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence
the attitudes of students toward government, the political process, and citizen's social
responsibilities." Id. at 1596.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1596. See note 43, supra.
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people of New York . . . made a judgment that citizenship should be
a qualification for teaching the young of the State in the public
schools, and § 3001(3) furthers that judgment."5
Arguably, the result of the Ambach decision is an expansion of
the Sugarman notion of governmental function. As outlined in
Sugarman, the governmental function exception was based on a
state's obligation to preserve the basic concept of its political com-
munity. Thus, the state has the power to exclude aliens from voting
and from holding important positions in which they would par-
ticipate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad
public policy.5' In Ambach the Court looked to two factors to deter-
mine that teaching in a public elementary or secondary school is a
governmental function requiring only a rational relationship to
uphold the legislative classification: (1) the role the particular activi-
ty plays in democratic society and (2) the degree of responsibility
and discretion of the person fulfilling that role. In contrast, the
Foley Court had looked to the role of the activity in democratic
society and the degree of responsibility and discretion of the person
fulfilling that role only in the context of the "formulation, execution,
or review of broad public policy" language of Sugarman.2 The Court
in Foley did not expressly single out these two factors as did the
Ambach Court.
Thus, in Ambach the Court seems to have equated the phrase
"broad public policy" with an activity which is important in
democratic society; similarly, the Ambach Court associated the
phrase "participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review
of broad public policy" with one who has great responsibility and
discretion in fulfilling an important activity in democratic society.
That this approach expands the governmental function exception is
apparent when one considers that, within the context of the
Sugarman language, an argument might be made that a police of-
ficer participates much more directly, and exercises much more
discretion, in the execution of broad public policy than does a school
teacher. Justice Blackmun apparently took this view, since, using
the Sugarman language as his guide, he concurred with the result
reached by the Court in Foley and, yet, dissented in Ambach.
This arguably uneven application of the- governmental function
exception is a by-product of the Court's decision in Graham which
declared alienage a suspect classification. The basic problem lies in
according strict scrutiny to classifications based on alienage. Subjec-
50. 99 S. Ct. at 1597.
51. See text at notes 24-29, supra.
52. See text at notes 33-38, supra.
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ting such classifications to this higher level of scrutiny is inconsis-
tent with the Constitution's own discriminations against aliens.
There are eleven instances of differentiation between citizens and
aliens in the Constitution," most of which limit federal office holding
and guarantees of the right to vote to citizens. Moreover, the first
sentence of the fourteenth amendment establishes the distinction
between citizens and aliens;" it is, therefore, difficult to believe that
the second sentence of the fourteenth amendment, guaranteeing all
persons due process and equal protection of the laws, was meant by
its framers to preclude legislative distinctions between citizens and
aliens .
In light of the Constitution's discriminations against aliens, the
suspect classification rationale of Graham cannot survive.' The
Court itself has implicitly recognized this by setting up a confusing
scheme of dual standards for reviewing equal protection challenges
53. These eleven instances are: U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; art. I § 3, cl. 3; art. I §
8, cl. 4; art. II, § 1, cl. 5; art. III, § 2, cl. 1; art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; amends. XI, XV, XIX, XX-
IV & XXVI. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 651-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. The first sentence of the fourteenth amendment provides: "All persons born
or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
Justice Rehnquist, in his Sugarman dissent wrote:
Not only do the numerous classifications on the basis of citizenship that are set
forth in the Constitution cut against both the analysis used and the results
reached by the Court in these cases; the very Amendment which the Court reads
to prohibit classifications based on citizenship establishes the very distinction
which the Court now condemns as "suspect."
413 U.S. at 652 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55. In his dissenting opinion in Sugarman, Justice Rehnquist stated:
Decisions of this Court holding that an alien is a "person" within the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are simply irrelevant
to the question of whether that Amendment prohibits legislative classifications
based upon this particular status. Since that Amendment by its own terms first
defined those who had the status as a lesser included class of all "persons," the
Court's failure to articulate why such classifications under the same Amendment
are now forbidden serves only to illuminate the absence of any constitutional
foundation for these instant decisions.
Id. at 653.
The Court in Graham, on the other hand, invoked Justice Stone's famous footnote
four from Carolene Products to support its designation of alienage as a suspect
classification: "Aliens as a class aie a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minori-
ty (see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938)) for
whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." 403 U.S. at 372. Whether
strict scrutiny represents the appropriate degree of "judicial solicitude," however, is
questionable given the Constitution's sanctioning of some discrimination against aliens,
see note 53, supra.
56. This is not to'say that the result reached in Graham is incorrect. See text at
note 60, infra.
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in alienage cases.57 Moreover, the Court has also recognized "para-
mount federal power over immigration and naturalization,""8 and has
upheld a federal statute which used an alienage-based
classification.59 Such recognition belies a strict scrutiny approach for
alienage classifications.
In reviewing a state statute which discriminates on the basis of
alienage, the starting point of analysis should be an investigation in-
to the possibility of preemption by the federal government, since
state restrictions on aliens cannot contravene the federal decision to
allow an alien the privilege of residing in the United States. The
Court has given broad scope to the notion of federal preemption,
striking down statutes that have infringed in some way upon the
alien's ability to support himself as inconsistent with the federal
government's decision to allow the alien to live in the United
States. 0 Given the sweep of the preemption doctrine, the fact that
57. On the desirability of a consistent standard for a given classificatory trait, see
Developments, supra note 4, at 1124-27. But see Note, supra note 11, at 1516.
58. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976). See note 25, supra.
59. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). See note 23, supra. Cf. Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (Court implied it would uphold a regulation restricting
the Federal Civil Service to citizens if the President or Congress authorized it). See
note 25, supra.
60. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish and
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). See notes 15 &
20, supra.
Since the Constitution grants to the federal government the power over naturaliza-
tion and immigration, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, the federal government is able to
act with greater freedom than state governments in matters involving aliens.
Therefore, although the level of review should be the same for equal protection pur-
poses at the federal and state levels, the federal government is free to impose restric-
tions on aliens that the state cannot. This can be seen by comparing Diaz with
Graham.
In Diaz the federal government was allowed to deny aliens the right to Medicare
supplemental medical insurance program benefits unless they had resided in the
United States for at least five years. In Graham the Court denied Arizona the ability
to restrict certain welfare benefits to aliens who had resided in the United States for
fifteen years. The Court in Graham gave as one basis for its decision federal-state rela-
tions:
Congress has broadly declared as federal policy that lawfully admitted resident
aliens who become public charges for causes arising after their entry are not sub-
ject to deportation, and that as long as they are here they are entitled to the full
and equal benefit of all state laws for the security of persons and property. The
state statutes at issue in the instant cases impose auxiliary burdens upon the en-
trance or residence of aliens who suffer the distress, after entry, of economic
dependency on public assistance.
403 U.S. at 378-79. By comparison, in Diaz the Court emphasized the important power
of the federal government over aliens which it said should not be restricted by a rule
of constitutional law which would "inhibit the flexibility of the political branches of
[the federal] government to respond to changing world conditions." 426 U.S. at 81.
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an alienage classification is not subject to strict scrutiny does not
mean that prohibitions directed at aliens would routinely be sus-
tained.
The state should be allowed to distinguish between citizens and
aliens in areas analogous to the Constitution's own differentiations
between citizens and aliens. If the Constitution establishes the basis
for a distinction between citizens and aliens insofar as office-holding
and voting guarantees are concerned, 1 then the states should also
be permitted to act on the basis of this differentiation. Apparently
the Court in Sugarman was attempting to establish this analogy
with its governmental function language since it said: "[O]ur
scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters
resting firmly within a State's constitutional prerogatives.""2 The
provisions which distinguish citizens and aliens in the Constitution
establish a conceptual notion of a political community from which a
non-member can be excluded. Thus, in cases in which the state law
is analogous to the Constitution's differentiations between citizens
and aliens, the state law is presumably constitutional.
How do public school teachers stand in relation to this notion of
a political community? If one accepts the Court's finding as to the
importance of a teacher's influence over his students' attitudes
regarding citizenship,"3 an argument can be made that limiting
employment as public school teachers to citizens and those desirous
of citizenship is necessary to preserve the political community. Yet,
how analogous is the function that teachers serve to the Constitu-
tion's limitations on office-holding and guarantees of voting? And if
public school teachers are so related to the notion of political com-
munity, what other activities fall within the protected relationship?
One area which will undoubtedly be challenged in the near
future is state restrictions on an alien's right to own and enjoy real
property. 4 If one looks to the Sugarman language alone it is difficult
61. See note 53, supra, and accompanying text.
62. 413 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added).
63. The findings of the Court in this area were based on its interpretation of
educational-psychological-sociological studies. 99 S. Ct. at 1595-96.
64. Alien ownership of real property is an area of growing concern among states,
particularly in relation to farm land. See generally Fisch, State Regulation of Alien
Land Ownership, 43 Mo. L. REV. 407 (1978). Sev'eral states already have legislation
restricting an alien's right to own, use, or dispose of real property. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. § 500.22 (1945); WYO. STAT. § 34-15-101 (1959). Many of the states which do not
have such legislation have had bills proposed in their most recent legislative sessions
which infringe upon the alien's rights to own and enjoy real property. See, e.g. Mont.
H.B. 101 (1979); N.M. H.B. 545 (1979); Pa. H.B. 853 (1979); S.C. H.B. 2217 (1979); Wash.
S.B. 2334 (1979).
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to see how ownership of real property relates to voting or the
holding of high public office. Even if one argued that the expanded
Ambach-Sugarman two-step "test" 5 should be used, such legislation
would apparently fall outside that "test" since the Court in Ambach
expressly limited its examination to areas of public employment.6" It
is difficult to see how the Court could sustain legislation which
would prohibit the resident alien from owning real property. Such a
statute seems inconsistent with the federal government's decision to
allow the alien to reside permanently in the United States. 7
Moreover, ownership of real property does not seem to relate to the
notion of a political community recognized by the Constitution. 8
However, if a state restricted only non-resident aliens' owner-
ship of land, a different question would be posed. There would be no
inquiry into federal preemption because that doctrine relates to
aliens lawfully admitted into the United States. 9 The determinative
factor thus would be the level of scrutiny. If the Court adheres to
Graham's strict scrutiny, it would seem that no compelling state in-
terest could be advanced to support such a classification."0 On the
other hand, if the Court abandons Graham, as the logic of the Con-
stitution would seem to compel, then the question is an open one. A
state's interest in keeping ownership in the hands of residents
might support such a classification if a standard less exacting than
65. In Ambach the Court looked to (1) the role an activity plays in democratic
society and (2) the degree of responsibility and discretion exercised by the person
fulfilling that role. 99 S. Ct. at 1594. If a state legislature were to become concerned
with increasing ownership of real property by aliens (and some apparently have
become concerned, see note 64, supra), then an argument in support of a ban on alien
ownership of real property might emphasize the role landowning has had historically
in the United States and the landowner's discretion in using his property in a manner
inimical to the "political community's" interest.
66. 99 S. Ct. at 1594 n.6.
67. See notes 15 & 20, supra.
68. See text at notes 61-62, supra.
69. See the cases cited in note 60, supra. In DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976),
the Supreme Court ruled that the federal power over immigration did not preempt
California's right to pass a statute forbidding employers from knowingly employing il-
legal aliens.
70. A compelling state interest is rarely found in examining a state statute under
close judicial scrutiny. Professor Gunther has stated that the close judicial scrutiny
standard is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, supra note 4, at 8. The only
statutory-type rules explicitly discriminating on the basis of race and/or nationality,
which were upheld by the Court after subjecting them to close judicial scrutiny, were
tested during World War II. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(upholding a military order excluding Americans of Japanese origin from designated
West Coast areas after Pearl Harbor); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)
(sustaining a military curfew on persons of Japanese ancestry in West Coast areas dur-
ing the early months of World War II). See L. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 1000.
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strict scrutiny were used." The constitutionality of excluding aliens
from land ownership is just one of the many questions that the
Court must answer in trying to escape from the analytical morass
created by the Graham opinion. Hopefully, any new analytical struc-
ture adopted by the Court will rest on firmer ground.
Jan C. Holloway
AN OVERVIEW OF IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION:
Cannon v. University of Chicago
Plaintiff, a female denied admission to two private medical
schools, filed a complaint with the local office of the United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) alleging that
both schools violated Title IX of the federal Education Amendments
of 1972' which prohibits sex discrimination in most educational insti-
tutions. When the department delayed taking any action on the com-
plaint, plaintiff filed a private suit in federal district court. The dis-
trict court held that plaintiff had no private cause of action under
Title IX because Congress, in providing for an administrative
scheme of enforcement within the provisions of the Act, intended
that to be the only available remedy for violation of the Act. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court decision. Reversing the lower court decision, the
United States Supreme Court held that a private litigant may pur-
sue a private cause of action under Title IX. Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979).
71. See note 4, supra. The state's interest might be weighty enough if non-
resident aliens were purchasing real property to such an extent that the health of the
economy might be affected.
One author has implied that the real thrust of the DeCanas holding, that a state
may, without preemption, forbid employers from hiring illegal aliens, see note 69,
supra, is indicated by the use of equal protection language in a preemption case. That
author suggests that the Court is indicating a lesser standard than strict scrutiny.
Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31 STAN. L.
REv. 1069, 1081 (1979). There may be a further question as to whether a non-resident
alien who is precluded from purchasing land in this country is even entitled to the
benefit of the equal protection clause. Id. at 1080-81. In Yick Wo the Court had said
only that equal protection was a pledge to "all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States." 118 U.S. at 369.
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976).
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